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Abstract 
 
 This thesis assesses whether the EU is as a market power shaping third 
countries' legislation and policies as asserted by "Market Power Europe", a theoretical 
framework, which has been insufficiently explored in the literature so far. More 
concretely it is scrutinised if electricity market liberalisation and emissions trading 
acquis has been externalised to Switzerland and Ukraine. First, it is shown that there 
is market power potential in the field of energy, as the European regulatory order was 
increasingly strengthened since the mid-1990s and gave birth to two significant 
markets for electricity and carbon emissions trade. Second, it is demonstrated that 
even though acquis externalization occurred to a certain extent in both cases, four 
intervening variables filtered the EU's market power. Indeed, market 
interconnectedness, political culture, the nature of the political system and the level of 
institutionalization of the EU's relations with a third country need to be taken into 
account when assessing the EU's market power in a given third country. These 
findings are not only theoretically relevant, they also suggest that the EU should 
concentrate on the development of its Single Market and regulatory order as well as 
on solid institutional framework conditions to cement its power towards third 
countries and enlarge its global influence. 
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1. Introduction 
 
With the completion of the Single Market and the signature of the Maastricht Treaty 
in 1992, the European Union (EU) emerged as a powerful actor within Europe and 
towards its neighbourhood. Indeed, from 1992 onwards, the EU became an 
increasingly important player on the international stage as it endowed itself with a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy and extended its competences towards non-
trade areas.1 Internally, the EU consolidated its Single Market throughout the various 
reform Treaties that followed the Maastricht Treaty (Amsterdam, Nice, Lisbon) by 
giving birth to an ever more complete institutional and regulatory framework. 
Externally, the EU also increasingly institutionalised its relationship with third 
countries from its neighbourhood through various forms of cooperation (European 
Neighbourhood Policy, European Economic Area and bilateral agreements). 
 As a result of this process of consolidation and with the gain of importance of 
the EU on the international stage, scholarly contributions about the nature of the EU's 
power and the shaping impact it has on third countries' policies and legislation have 
multiplied significantly from the 2000s on.2  While for a long time the debate 
concerning the nature of the EU's power has been concentrated around its normative 
identity3, it turned towards the EU's economic strength more recently. Indeed, with its 
conceptual framework "Market Power Europe" (MPE), the scholar Damro gave the 
internal process of Single Market consolidation and regulation an external policy 
dimension.4 According to MPE, the EU is a market power that, intentionally or 
unintentionally, externalises its own market-related policies and regulations to third 
countries.5 As the EU is traditionally portrayed as a weak actor on the international 
stage, whose agenda is driven by a few powerful Member States, the theoretical 
framework set up by Damro presents an interesting alternative angle for the 
                                                
1  Desmond Dinan (2014), Europe Recast: A History of European Union, Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 238-241 & 283-293. 
2 Chad Damro (2015), "Market power Europe: exploring a dynamic conceptual framework", Journal of 
European Public Policy, 22(9), 1337-1339; Frank Schimmelfennig (2015), "Europeanization beyond 
Europe", Living Reviews in European Governance, 10(1), 5-6. See chapter three for a more detailed 
analysis of the literature. 
3 Jan Manners (2002), "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, JCMS, 40(2), 235-258. 
4 Chad Damro (2012), "Market power Europe", Journal of European Public Policy, 19(5), 682-699. 
5 Ibid. 
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assessment of the EU's genuine influence on third countries' legislative and regulatory 
order. While the literature has demonstrated that this influence is substantial in the 
case of countries having a credible membership perspective6, this is less clear for 
those having no membership perspective in the near future. 
 The assertion that the EU's power lies within its Single Market is supported 
when one assesses the importance of this market for third countries. Regarding the 
trade of goods for instance, the Single Market remains the most tangible proof of the 
EU's international economic relevance and power, as in comparison to foreign 
markets it is nowadays a leading force. Indeed, in terms of GDP, the EU is the first 
economic power as it accounted for 23.8% of the world GDP in 2014.7 Moreover, the 
EU market comprises more than 508 million consumers.8  
 Nevertheless, this focus on trade in goods neglects the fact that in other non-
trade areas such as energy policy, the Single Market project was also increasingly 
pursued since the mid-1990s. Indeed, the goal to form a common European energy 
market started to be transposed into legislation from 1996 on with the first energy 
package. Additionally, the goal of carbon emissions reduction emerged as another 
central goal of EU energy policy in the late 1990s. The latter was also to be addressed 
through a market-based policy: the trade of carbon emissions allowances caped at a 
pre-defined target-level within a single European market, namely the EU Emission 
Trading System (ETS), which started to function in 2005. Therefore the EU could 
potentially be considered as a market power in the field of energy according to MPE 
 Nonetheless, regarding this field MPE lacks comprehensive theoretical testing. 
This thesis therefore, seeks to answer the following question: Is the EU a market 
power towards third countries, which have no membership perspective in the near 
future, in the area of energy policy?  
 By raising this question, the aim is to explore the strength of the MPE concept 
in non-trade areas and to make the theory more resilient to analytical failure in 
upcoming studies by exploring the variables that might interfere with the theory's 
expectations. In order to obtain a comprehensive answer, MPE will be asserted 
through two case studies: Switzerland, a most-likely, and Ukraine, a least-likely case. 
                                                
6 Ulrich Sedelmeier (2011), "Europeanisation in new member and candidate states", Living Reviews in 
European Governance, 6(1), 31. 
7 Eurostat (2016), "The EU in the World: 2016 Edition", Luxembourg, Publication Office of the 
European Union, 79. 
8 Figures from 2015. In ibid., 22. 
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The timeframe of the thesis will go from the mid-1990s, marking the beginning of 
energy-policy making at the EU level, until May 2017 as energy policy developments 
have been taking place until then both in Switzerland and Ukraine. 
 The main argument of this thesis is that the EU is a constrained market power 
in the area of energy policy, as several factors have been affecting its ability to 
externalise energy acquis9 in Switzerland and Ukraine. As a result, it is argued that 
four intervening variables should be added to MPE in order to strengthen it for future 
research: market interconnectedness, political culture, the nature of the domestic 
political system and the level of institutionalisation of a country's bilateral relations 
with the EU.  
 To begin with, the theoretical framework and research design of the study are 
laid down in the second chapter. Further, the literature is reviewed in chapter three by 
highlighting the existing gap in terms of empirical research within the debate around 
the nature of the EU's power and by linking this debate to the "Europeanization 
beyond Europe"10 literature, which can contribute to reinforce MPE. Subsequently, 
chapter four outlines the set up and current state of EU energy policy, more precisely 
concerning electricity market integration and the EU ETS. The fifth and sixth chapter 
then present the empirical findings of energy acquis externalization in Switzerland 
and Ukraine. For Switzerland it is shown that although acquis approximation was 
high on the agenda since the mid-1990s, the EU's regulatory order has been finally 
only partially implemented so far. In the Ukrainian case, it is observed that acquis 
externalization only began very recently although the country committed to it 
rhetorically since the mid-2000s already. In chapter seven, these findings are then 
analysed and the theoretical implications for MPE drawn by asserting the existence 
four domestic and structural intervening variables filtering the theory's analytical 
strength. Finally, policy recommendations for the EU regarding the exercise of its 
market power in general and the on-going "Brexit" negotiations are made in the 
conclusion. 
  
                                                
9 The acquis communautaire, or acquis, contains all rights and obligations that are legally binding for 
all EU Member States. In European Commission, Acquis, 06.12.16, available online: 
http://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/acquis_en, consulted the 
15.12.16. 
10 Schimmelfennig (2015), "Europeanization beyond Europe", 5. 
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2. Theoretical Framework, Research Design and Methodology 
 
The conceptual framework formulated by Damro through MPE is central to this 
thesis. MPE is formed by three main characteristics: the relative market size, the 
regulatory capacity and the results of interest contestation taking place within the EU 
regarding acquis externalization to third countries. If market size and regulatory 
capacity are substantial and interest groups in favour of acquis export are able to 
shape the political process, acquis externalization is expected to occur. 
 Regarding the above-presented conceptual framework, the aim of this thesis is 
threefold. First, the analysis will try to assess whether EU market-related policies and 
regulations have successfully been externalised to Switzerland and Ukraine. If this is 
the case, it can be asserted that the EU is a regional, perhaps global market power, not 
only regarding trade issues, but also within non-trade policy areas such as energy 
policy. A second goal of this study is to assess whether MPE is well suited for non-
trade areas, a point left open by Damro who claims that whereas "evidence of MPE 
abounds in trade policy, further analyses should include all of the EU's market-related 
policies and regulatory measures"11. Last but not least, an third objective of this thesis 
is to explore whether intervening variables should be added to MPE, in order to 
provide the theory with a more comprehensive and solid analytical framework.  
 These three goals also explain the choice made with regards to the policy area 
analysed and the case selection. To begin with, the field of energy policy, more 
precisely the EU-wide electricity market integration and the EU ETS have been 
selected, as they constitute non-trade policies that are market-related and have not yet 
been assessed throughout the lens of MPE. Subsequently, the case studies selected, 
namely Switzerland and Ukraine, present on the one hand a most-likely case 
(Switzerland) and on the other hand a least-likely case (Ukraine). Indeed, due to its 
geographical position, Switzerland is an important regional actor in European 
electricity transit and cross-border trade.12 Moreover, the Swiss economy is highly 
interconnected to the European Single Market as the latter accounts for 54% of its 
                                                
11 Chad Damro (2012), "Market power Europe", 696. 
12 International Energy Agency (IEA) (2012), "Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Switzerland 2012 
Review", OECD/IEA, Paris: IEA Publications, 91. 
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exports and 72% of its imports.13 The externalization of EU energy market-related 
policies to Switzerland is therefore expected. Conversely, this is less likely in 
Ukraine, due to its geographic position at the Eastern border of the EU and its energy 
dependency on fossil fuels coming from or transiting through its powerful Russian 
neighbour, which reduces the likelihood of pro-EU policies in Ukraine as a negative 
reaction from Russia could potentially challenge domestic security of supply.14 
Indeed, it is estimated that in 2005 Russia was by far the main country of origin or 
transit for Ukraine's fossil fuels accounting for 85% of the country's oil, about 75% of 
its gas and all of its nuclear fuel imports.15 Moreover, the presence of influential 
interest groups, which are opposed to market integration in the field of energy in 
Ukraine, notably in the steel sector relying on non-competitive electricity prices, is 
also reducing the likelihood of EU energy acquis approximation.16 The choice of a 
most-likely and a least-likely case is motivated by the fact that in case of absence of 
acquis externalization in Switzerland, the theory would be highly discredited, while 
clear acquis approximation in Ukraine, would strengthen it.  
 The independent variables are the afore-mentioned three characteristics of 
MPE and the dependent variable is the externalization of the relevant acquis, id est 
market-related policies and regulations governing the European electricity and carbon 
emission markets. Four intervening variables are suggested in order to reinforce MPE. 
As it will be seen in chapter three, two of these variables, id est market 
interconnectedness and political culture, have already been discussed by the literature 
on "Europeanization beyond Europe". The third and fourth variables that could be 
identified are the nature of the domestic political system and the level of 
institutionalization of the EU's relations with a given third country. 
 This qualitative research study will follow the method of process tracing 
because it makes it possible to follow each step of the causal process from the 
adoption of EU policies to their potential approximation in Swiss and Ukrainian 
legislation respectively. The empirical data used will be constituted of reports from 
                                                
13 Federal Department of Foreign Affairs - Directorate for European Affairs (2017), "Politique 
européenne de la Suisse", https://www.eda.admin.ch/content/dam/dea/fr/documents/folien/Folien-
Europapolitik_fr.pdf, consulted online on 03.06.2017. 
14 International Energy Agency (IEA) (2006), "Ukraine: Energy Policy Review 2006", OECD/IEA, 
Paris: IEA Publications, 31. 
15 Ibid. 
16  Stephan Hofer (2008), Die Europäische Union als Regelexporteur: Die Europäisierung der 
Energiepolitik in Bulgarien, Serbien und der Ukraine, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 155-156. 
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the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Energy Community, official 
documents and energy legislation from the EU, Switzerland and Ukraine, 
international treaties and agreements, declarations from stakeholders from the private 
sector and the civil society as well as secondary literature. Finally the timespan of the 
analysis will go from the mid-1990s, marking the starting point of energy policy-
making at the EU level, to May 2017, given the fact that relevant political and 
legislative activity took place until then in Switzerland and Ukraine. 
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3. Literature review 
 
Two main theoretical approaches have looked into the EU's ability to influence third 
countries' legislation and to act as an influential actor within the international system: 
the literature discussing the nature of the EU's power and the literature on 
'"Europeanization beyond Europe". The former has already been debating the nature 
of the EU's power on the world stage since the early 1970s. The latter emerged much 
more recently, in the mid-2000s, as an extension of studies concentrating on the 
effects that European integration has on the Member States' internal policies, by 
widening the scope of analysis to the EU's neighbourhood.17 Both debates are relevant 
for our study, as they analyse the EU's role as a rule exporter in third countries. 
 To begin with, the debate on the nature of the EU as an international actor 
started with the assertion of Duchêne that the EU should be characterised as a 
"civilian power" lacking military power and possessing essentially economic power.18 
Subsequently, Manners considerably shaped the power debate by asserting that the 
EU's power is not defined by "what it does or what it says, but what it is"19. Indeed, 
through his concept of "Normative Power Europe" based on empirical findings of the 
EU's promotion of the death penalty on the international stage, Manners portrayed the 
EU as an actor shaping third countries' and international organizations' norms. As a 
reaction to this emphasis on norms regarding the role of the EU as a global power, 
some scholars started to focus on the economic clout of the EU, notably by including 
the European Single Market into the equation. To start with, Meunier and Nicolaïdis 
defined the EU as a "power through trade" by showing how the EU has been 
increasingly using access to its internal market to influence legislation and policies in 
third countries. 20 This marks an important step towards the establishment of MPE, 
which is central to this study. Further, Bach & Newman argued that the Single Market 
alone is not a sufficient explanatory variable of the EU's power.21 Indeed, they 
                                                
17 Schimmelfennig (2015), "Europeanization beyond Europe", 5. 
18 François Duchêne (1973), "The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence". In 
M. Kohnstamm & W. Hager (Eds.), A Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems before the 
European Community. London: Macmillan, 19-20. 
19 Manners (2002), "Normative Power Europe", 252. 
20 Sophie Meunier & Kalypso Nicolaïdis (2006), "The European Union as a conflicted trade power", 
Journal of European Public Policy, 13(6), 907. 
21 David Bach & Abraham L. Newman (2007), "The European regulatory state and global public 
policy: micro-institutions, macro-influence", Journal of European Public Policy", 14(6), 827-846. 
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asserted that through the set up of a "regulatory state"22, the EU has been able to 
expand its influence on global markets. In the same vein, Bradford formulated the 
concept of the "Brussels effect" by stating that the EU is unilaterally setting 
regulatory standards thanks to the size of the Single Market, the regulatory capacity 
and the institutional strength of the EU to enforce its regulations. 23  This last 
contribution brings us closer to MPE that was developed by Damro, who designed an 
interesting synthesis of the above-discussed theoretical developments. Indeed, he 
defined the EU as a market power whose ability to externalise market-related policies 
and regulations in third countries is determined by the relative size of the Single 
Market, the regulatory capacity of the EU as well as by the result of interest 
contestation between interest groups active within the European political arena.24 So 
far, MPE has only been tested within the field of trade policy by Dahl Kelstrup, who 
stressed the importance of intervening factors, such as the position of other 
international organizations and the EU's ability to remain united towards third states 
in trade-related negotiations or policy areas.25 Nevertheless, as Damro himself asserts 
it, the MPE concept "may cover all areas related to market regulation"26. As there is 
currently a lack of contributions testing empirically the concept in non-trade related 
areas such as energy policy, my thesis is filling this cap. 
 Additionally, the "Europeanization beyond Europe" literature provides useful 
analytical tools, which can strengthen and improve MPE, but also possesses certain 
shortcomings, which this thesis aims to address. To start with, this literature emerged 
out of a corpus of contributions that focused first on the EU's shaping nature within 
Member States and later on within candidate countries.27 Further, the literature 
expanded its scope beyond candidate countries by researching the determinant factors 
enabling effective EU-rule transfer in these countries. Through the analysis of case 
studies in the Eastern neighborhood, the literature has highlighted multiple variables, 
which are close to the characteristics brought up by MPE. Indeed, scholars have 
                                                
22 Ibid., 828. 
23 Anu Bradford (2012), "The Brussels Effect", Northwestern University Law Review, 107(1), 1-68. 
24 Damro (2012), "Market power Europe", 682-699 
25 Jesper Dahl Kelstrup (2015), "Market Power Europe - A Constructive Critique", International 
Journal of Public Administration, 38(12), 895-901. 
26 Damro (2012), "Market power Europe", 696. 
27 Schimmelfennig (2015), "Europeanization beyond Europe", 5-6. 
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identified the importance of the Single Market and potential economic gains28, as well 
as regulatory capacity of the EU29, as important factors for effective EU-rule transfer. 
However, MPE as such has never been fully empirically tested by this literature.  
 A major contribution of the literature on "Europeanization beyond Europe" 
was the argument of Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, who analysed the effectiveness 
of EU rule transfer in the context of the accession process of Central and Eastern 
European Countries (CEEC) and concluded that accession conditionality is an 
extremely effective tool regarding the externalization of EU acquis.30 They argued 
that the so-called "logic of appropriateness"31, id est the similarity between domestic 
and EU norms, was not determinant for the effective externalization of EU 
regulations. However, by identifying domestic political culture as an intervening 
variable to MPE, I argue that the level of similarity between domestic and EU norms 
matters as it filters the EU's market power, thus acquis approximation in third 
countries.  
 Another interesting variable, which has been proposed in this literature as 
influencing the outcome of EU rule transfer, is the level of interconnectedness of a 
given third country with the EU market. Indeed, in their case study on Ukraine, 
Dimitrova & Dragneva argued that schemes of interdependences with Russia, and the 
lack of these with the EU, in the field of energy restrained effective regulatory 
approximation to EU acquis.32 Last but not least, Schimmelfennig asserted in its 
literature review on "Europeanization beyond Europe" that for the Eastern 
neighborhood, the effective externalization of EU regulations depends also on the 
                                                
28 Stephan Hofer (2008), Die Europäische Union als Regelexporteur, 1-206; Heiko Prange-Gstöhl 
(2009), "Enlarging the EU's internal energy market: Why would third countries accept EU rule 
export?", Energy Policy, 37, 5296-5303; Sandra Lavenex (2014), "The power of functionalist 
extension: how EU rules travel", Journal of European Public Policy, 21(6), 885-903. 
29 Sandra Lavenex & Frank Schimmelfennig (2009), "EU rules beyond EU borders: theorizing external 
governance in European politics", Journal of European Policy, 16(6), 791-812; Lavenex (2014), "The 
power of functionalist extension", 885-903; Frank Schimmelfennig (2015), "Europeanization beyond 
Europe", 1-34. 
30 Frank Schimmelfennig & Ulrich Sedelmeier (Eds.) (2005), The Europeanization of Central and 
Eastern Europe, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1-256. 
31 James G. March & Johan P. Olsen (1989), Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of 
Politics, New York: Free Press, 160-162.  
32  Antoaneta Dimitrova & Rilka Dragneva (2009), "Constraining external governance: 
interdependence with Russia and the CIS as limits to the EU's rule transfer in Ukraine", Journal of 
European Public Policy, 16(6), 853-872.  
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dependency on the EU in a given policy area.33 By proposing the level of market 
interconnectedness with a third country as another intervening variable to MPE, I am 
building on these theoretical developments and demonstrating that the literature on 
"Europeanization beyond Europe" provides an interesting variable, which impacts the 
effective deployment of EU market power.  
 In summary, my thesis is completing the lack of consistent empirical research, 
in the two above-discussed schools, testing MPE in third countries without credible 
membership perspective, notably in non-trade areas such as energy. Moreover, in line 
with the suggestion from Damro (2015) that "the EU's exercise of power may be 
conditioned by external or international contextual factors" that have to be 
incorporated in MPE as they are "involved in externalization and the ways in which 
they are transmitted through the three characteristics of MPE"34, my study provides 
deeper knowledge about these factors, which enable or hinder the EU to exert market 
power. This also achieved y partially drawing on the literature on "Europeanization 
beyond Europe". 
 
 
  
                                                
33 Frank Schimmelfennig (2015), "Europeanization beyond Europe", 1-34. 
34 Damro (2015), "Market power Europe: exploring a dynamic conceptual framework", 1343. 
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4. Historical overview and regulatory state of EU energy policy 
 
This chapter operationalizes the so-called "subjects of externalization"35, id est the 
market-related policies and regulations which are formed within the EU and then 
shape policy developments in non-Member States. Regarding EU energy and climate 
policy, EU legislation and regulations covering the electricity market integration 
process as well as the EU ETS are hereafter identified as such subjects to be 
externalised in Switzerland and Ukraine. As defined by Damro, this can occur on an 
intentional or unintentional basis.36 Moreover, the market power characteristics of 
regulatory capacity and relative market size are briefly assessed. Although, the 
Commission has proposed reforms regarding the regulation of the European 
electricity market as well as the EU ETS in December 2016, these are still under 
discussion within the co-decision procedure and will therefore not be taken into 
account. 
 
 
4.1 Late "communitarisation" of EU energy policy and shortcomings 
 
The electricity sector has for a long time been considered as a sector of the economy, 
which needed to receive a special treatment in terms of regulation for political and 
economic reasons, as it was seen as essential for economic development as well as 
societal welfare.37 As a result, most European governments authorised the set up or 
established themselves vertically integrated energy companies, which were given a 
monopoly over generation, transmission and distribution of energy to consumers.38  
 This also explains the absence of a common energy policy in the early days of 
the European project, as the Member States' main concern was to remain in control 
over their monopolies for the sake of national energy security. 39  It is only in l988 that 
the Commission, inspired by British and Scandinavian liberalisation experiences, 
                                                
35 Damro (2012), "Market power Europe", 690. 
36 Ibid. 
37 A. Ispolinov & T. Dvenadtsatova (2012), "THE CREATION OF A COMMON EU ENERGY 
MARKET: A QUIET REVOLUTION WITH FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES", Baltic Region, 
2(16), 79. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Kim (2016), Introduction to EU Energy Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3. 
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advocated for the first time the creation of an internal energy market through the 
elimination of technical barriers to energy trade.40  
 This marks a major switch in the Commission's rationale as energy supply was 
no longer seen as a service to be provided by the state, but as a commodity obeying to 
EU competition law. 41  Two major elements needed to be enforced in the 
Commission's view in order to ensure competition: ending national monopolies 
(except for the transmission networks) and guaranteeing third party access to 
transmission networks.42 The legislative breakthrough finally came in 1996 with 
Directive 96/92/EC43, which was part of the first energy package. The latter started 
separating electricity transmission from its generation and distribution by requiring 
from vertically integrated companies to adopt different bookkeeping and management 
structures within the companies and by demanding a partial opening of the electricity 
market within five years. 44  Nevertheless, these measures proofed to be highly 
inefficient and a second energy package was adopted in 2002. Central to this package 
was Directive 2003/54/EC45, which demanded further unbundling for companies 
(legal separation of organisation and decision-making structures) and obliged Member 
States to establish one or more national regulator(s).46 Furthermore, the opening of the 
market for non-household consumers and household consumers had to be effective 
until July 2004 and July 2007 respectively.47 
 Regarding, the fight against climate change, activity at the EU-level started 
earlier as it was already included as a common EU-wide goal in the Maastricht Treaty 
of 1992.48 Climate change, and more specifically the reduction of carbon emissions, 
                                                
40 Commission of the European Communities, "The internal energy market. Commission working 
document", COM (88) 238 final, Brussels, 02.05.1988, 1-88. 
41  Ispolinov & Dvenadtsatova (2012), "THE CREATION OF A COMMON EU ENERGY 
MARKET", 80. 
42 Ibid., 81. 
43 "DIRECTIVE 96/92/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 19 
December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity", Official Journal of the 
European Communities, L 27, 30.01.1997, 20-29. 
44  Ispolinov & Dvenadtsatova (2012), "THE CREATION OF A COMMON EU ENERGY 
MARKET", 81-82. 
45 "DIRECTIVE 2003/54/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 26 
June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 
96/92/EC", Official Journal of the European Communities, L 176, 15.07.2003, 37-55. 
46 Directive 2003/54/EC, Art. 10, 15 & 23. 
47 Ibid., Art. 21. 
48 Eugenio Cusumano (2014), "Handing Over Leadership: Transatlantic Environmental Governance as 
a Functional Relationship", Transworld Working Paper, 36, 7.  
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became rapidly a major component of EU energy policy due to the fact that 70-90% 
of greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions were generated by energy-related carbon 
emissions.49 At the centre of the EU's strategy to push forward its objective of 
decarbonisation lays the EU ETS, which was created through Directive 2003/87/EC50 
and started to function as a market in 2005.51 
 Due to drawbacks within the ETS and as a result of the disappointing 
conclusions of the Commission's inquiry on the functioning of the EU energy market, 
both policy goals of decarbonisation and market integration were addressed together 
for the first time within the period 2007-2009 with the third energy package as well as 
the 2020 climate and energy package.52 The current stage of electricity market 
liberalisation and the ETS will now be analysed separately in order to assess the 
potential EU market power for these two EU-wide markets. 
 
 
4.2 European electricity and carbon emission markets: current regulatory 
state 
4.2.1 Electricity market integration: regulatory state and relative market size 
With the third energy package, the EU addressed most of the shortcomings of the two 
earlier legislative packages regarding third party access to transmission and 
distribution networks, the effective unbundling of the latter from generation and 
supply activities and EU-wide market supervision. This reinforced the regulatory 
capacity of the EU in the field of electricity liberalisation and further stimulated the 
formation of a common electricity market.  
                                                
49 David Buchan & Malcolm Keay (2015), Europe's Long Energy Journey: Towards an Energy 
Union?, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 13. 
50 "Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 
establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and 
amending Council Directive 96/61/EC", Official Journal of the European Union, L 275, 25.10.2003, 
32-46. 
51 European Commission (2016), "The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS)", Publications Office, 
available online: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/factsheet_ets_en.pdf, consulted the 
20.03.2017. 
52 Buchan & Keay (2015), Europe's Long Energy Journey, 17-19. 
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 To begin with, the guarantee of third party access to transmission and 
distribution networks has been reinforced with the Electricity Directive 2009/72/EC53, 
as it gave the National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) further monitoring 
competences regarding network tariffs applied by network companies or 
subsidiaries.54 Furthermore, with the "Regulation on network access for cross-border 
exchange of electricity"55, electricity network access in cross-border cases is regulated 
by requiring a "non-discriminatory market-based" allocation of cross-border capacity 
from national Transmission System Operators (TSOs).56 Finally, third party access 
has been also guaranteed by the Commission through the enforcement of EU 
competition law, notably through the so-called doctrine of essential facilities.57 
 Subsequently, the effective unbundling of vertically integrated undertakings 
has been further strengthened through the third energy package. Indeed, three models 
of unbundling are defined in Directive 2009/72/EC: the ownership unbundling model, 
the Independent System Operator (ISO) model and the Independent Transmission 
Operator (ITO) model.58 First, under the full ownership model, which is in principle 
the model to follow by the Member States, the network company cannot exercise 
anything else than activities linked to its network.59 Second, the ISO and ITO models 
leave member states the discretion to allow network ownership of electricity 
companies under certain strictly formulated independency conditions to be respected 
regarding the management of transmission activities. 60 For all three models, it is not 
allowed to be member in a body, which is legally representing a generation or supply 
company, and to have this function within a TSO at the same time.61  
                                                
53 "DIRECTIVE 2009/72/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 13 
July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 
2003/54/EC", Official Journal of the European Union, L 211, 14.08.2009, 55-93. 
54 Talus (2016), Introduction to EU Energy Law, 19-20. 
55  "REGULATION (EC) No 714/2009 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in 
electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003", Official Journal of the European Union, L 
211, 14.08.2009, 15-35. 
56 Regulation ((EC) No 714/3009), Art.12. 
57 Talus (2016), Introduction to EU Energy Law, 21-22. 
58 Fernando Cordero Martínez (2014), "The EU Energy Market Puzzle; Is There Still a Way Out? The 
Case for a Fourth Energy Package Along Completely Different Lines", Renewable Energy Law and 
Policy Review, 121, 2-3. 
59 Directive (2009/72/EC), Art.9. 
60 Ibid., Art.13-16. 
61 Ibid., Art.9. 
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 Finally, since 2009 the scope of EU-wide market supervision has been 
broadened and a common regulatory agency been created with the Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER). On the one hand, the NRAs competences 
and objectives were clarified in order to ensure their commitment to the creation of a 
common electricity market through the elimination of barriers to cross-border trade.62 
The NRAs full independence from private and public entities was also reinforced 
through provisions such as separate annual budget allocation and specific rules on the 
appointment of management.63 On the other hand, EU-wide institutions were set up 
with ACER and the European Network of Transmission System Operators for 
Electricity (ENTSO-E)64. The latter replaced the Union for the Co-ordination of 
Transmission of Electricity (UCTE).65 ACER is operating since March 2011 and has 
the role to coordinate cooperation between NRAs and TSOs respectively.66 Through 
its Framework Guidelines submitted to the Commission, ACER has also significant 
influence over the development of network codes, which are then adopted by the 
Commission and enable comprehensive EU-wide market design. 67  Additionally, 
ACER has extensive power regarding the supervision of wholesale markets granted 
by the Regulation on energy market transparency and integrity (REMIT)68.69  
 Via this upgraded regulatory framework provided by the third energy package, 
the EU's "regulatory capacity"70 (one of the MPE characteristics) over electricity 
market integration has been considerably strengthened since the launch of the first 
energy package in 1996. With ACER, the EU has, since 2011, a fully operational 
regulatory agency, which is influential within the process of market design, id est the 
definition of network access and rules governing it. This regulatory authority is 
notably expressed through the network codes, such as the one established by the 
                                                
62 Talus (2016), Introduction to EU Energy Law, 49-50. 
63 Directive (2009/72/EC), Art.35.  
64 ENTSO-E, "Union for the Coordination of the Transmission of Electricity (UCTE)", available 
online: https://www.entsoe.eu/news-events/former-associations/ucte/Pages/default.aspx, consulted the 
04.06.2017. 
65 Ibid. 
66  "REGULATION (EC) No 713/2009 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators", Official 
Journal of the European Union, L 211, 14.08.2009, Art.6 & 7. 
67 Regulation ((EC) No 714/3009), Preamble, al.6 & Art.6 
68 "REGULATION (EU) No 1227/2011 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL of 25 October 2011 on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency", Official 
Journal of the European Union, L 326, 08.12.2011, 1-16. 
69 Talus (2016), Introduction to EU Energy Law, 47-48. 
70 Damro (2012), "Market power Europe", 688. 
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Commission Regulation on Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management 
(CACM)71, which is of relevance regarding our case studies as it affects their 
inclusion within the European electricity market. Thus, "regulatory capacity" is high. 
 Regarding the MPE characteristic of the relative market size, it can be argued 
that it increased substantially in the last two decades as an integrated European 
electricity market has been emerging. Indeed, this can be observed on the wholesale 
market, which is separated into various markets depending on the timeframe of trade, 
and regroups both large industrial consumers and electricity suppliers. 72  More 
specifically, the formation of a common electricity market has been taking place on 
the day-ahead market, which is the most important of these markets.73 Indeed, so-
called "market coupling" of national day-ahead markets started in the late 1990s 
amongst Scandinavian countries and expanded significantly since the mid-2000s, 
notably in the last years.74 As a result, the current European day-ahead market is 
formed by 19 Member States and is becoming increasingly interconnected.75 The 
relative market size is therefore important.  
 Regarding the third MPE characteristic of interest contestation it must be 
acknowledged that it is difficult to obtain accessible information about it at the EU-
level. Moreover, as it will be shown in the next two chapters, the findings suggest that 
interest contestation took mainly place at a domestic rather than at a EU-level, with 
local interest groups campaigning in favour or against the adoption of EU-compatible 
legislation. 
 
                                                
71 "COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) 2015/1222 of 24 July 2015 establishing a guideline on 
capacity allocation and congestion management", Official Journal of the European Union, 25.07.2015, 
L 197, 24-72. 
72 KU Leuven Energy Institute (2015), "The current electricity market design in Europe", EI Fact 
Sheet, 1, 1. 
73 Ibid., 2. 
74 Buchan & Keay (2015), Europe's Long Energy Journey", 34. 
75 Namely: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greta Britain (without Northern 
Ireland), Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. In ibid., 34. 
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4.2.2 ETS: current regulatory state and relative market size 
The EU ETS is currently the largest GHG emissions trading scheme worldwide.76 It is 
a central tool in the context of the EU's commitment to reduce its GHG emissions by 
20% until 2020 and by 40% until 2030 (based on the levels of GHG emissions in 
1990), laid down in "Directive 2009/29/EC"77 and the "2030 Energy Strategy"78 
respectively. The EU ETS has a clear external dimension as it was already specified 
in its founding "Directive 2003/87/EC" that the EU ETS should be linked to other 
markets.79 Due to a massive oversupply of carbon allowances, the regulatory state of 
the EU ETS has been changing substantially since its introduction in 2005. 
 The EU ETS functions under the so-called principle of "cap and trade", which 
means that a maximum of GHG emissions authorised for the sectors included in the 
scheme is fixed for a multi-year base in the form of carbon allowances, which can 
then be traded within a EU-wide market.80 The sectors covered by the EU ETS are 
power and heat generation, energy-intensive industries and civil aviation (since 
2012).81 The functioning of the system has been divided into various trading periods. 
During the two first periods (2005-2007 and 2008-2012), carbon allowances were 
distributed independently by the Member States, who provided their industries with 
sometimes even more emission allowances than they used to emit leading to a 
significant price drop for carbon allowances in 2006 already.82 Therefore, the whole 
system became ineffective as there was no economic incentive, as planned, to reduce 
GHG emissions. A major overhaul of the ETS Directive, starting during the third 
trading phase (2013-2020), was therefore adopted with "Directive 2009/29/EC". Since 
2013, allowances are distributed to Member States by the Commission based on "past 
total industrial emissions" in order to avoid the initial problems of oversupply of 
                                                
76  International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP) (2016), "Emissions Trading Worldwide: 
International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP) Status Report 2016", Berlin: ICAP, 31.  
77 "DIRECTIVE 2009/29/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 23 
April 2009 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission 
allowance trading scheme of the Community", Official Journal of the European Union, L 140, 
05.06.2009, 63-87. 
78 European Commission, " COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE 
AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS: A policy framework for climate and energy in the 
period from 2020 to 2030", Brussels, 22.1.2014, COM(2014) 15 final, 5. 
79 Directive 2003/87/EC, Art.25. 
80 European Commission (2016), "The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS)". 
81 Ibid. 
82 Buchan & Keay (2015), Europe's Long Energy Journey, 20. 
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allowances.83 Moreover, allowances were gradually directly auctioned on the market 
by businesses, with power generating industries being directly forced to do so since 
2013.84 Nonetheless, due to the financial crisis of 2008 as well as the following 
sovereign-debt crisis in the Eurozone, these measures were ineffective and further 
reforms such as the creation of a market stability reserve, aiming at neutralising the 
allowances in surplus by taking them out of the market, were decided in 2015.85  
 To begin with, "regulatory capacity" is fairly extensive, as the Commission 
possesses great sanctioning authority with the competence to fine companies emitting 
CO2 without possessing the necessary carbon emission allowances.86 Additionally, 
several bodies, most importantly the common auction platform of the European 
Energy Exchange (EEX) in Leipzig, the three national auction platforms of Germany, 
the UK and Poland, and the Commission, are responsible for the monitoring of the 
auctioning procedure.87 Furthermore, regulatory coherence and regulatory expertise 
has increased, as the Commission has been distributing carbon allowances 
independently to the Member States since 2013.  
 Subsequently, the EU ETS market is the biggest carbon emissions trading 
market world-wide covering approximately 45% of the EU's GHG emissions, on 
which 26 million allowances are exchanged on average on a daily basis (based on 
figures from 2015). 88  It comprises the 28 Member States as well as Iceland, 
Lichtenstein and Norway.89  Given these facts, the relative market size of the EU ETS 
is substantial. 
 As for the electricity market, the variable of interest contestation has proven to 
be difficult to assess for the EU ETS as well. 
 To conclude this chapter it can be asserted that according to MPE, both in the 
case of the electricity and carbon emissions markets, the EU's market power should be 
extensive. It will now be scrutinised in the next two chapters whether this is verified 
in terms of acquis externalization in Switzerland and Ukraine. 
  
                                                
83 Ibid., 21. 
84 European Commission (2016), "The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS)". 
85 Buchan & Keay (2015), Europe's Long Energy Journey, 26-31. 
86 ICAP (2016), "Emissions Trading Worldwide", 32. 
87 Edwin Woerdman (2015), "The EU Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme", Working Paper 
Series in Law and Economics, University of Groningen, 15-16.  
88 European Commission (2016), "The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS)". 
89 ICAP (2016), "Emissions Trading Worldwide", 32. 
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5. Switzerland 
 
Switzerland has always nurtured a close economic and political relationship with the 
EU, notably with its most important neighbouring states: Germany, France and Italy. 
In order to understand the structural context of the EU's rule externalization in 
Switzerland regarding electricity market liberalisation and the set up of a domestic 
ETS, it is necessary to recall the unique model of cooperation Switzerland has been 
fostering with the EU.  
 
 
5.1 The uniqueness and challenges of the bilateral path 
 
To begin with, the importance of the economic relations between Switzerland and the 
EU is portrayed by the early signature of a Free Trade Agreement in 1972.90 While, 
the relationship flourished economically, it was substantially destabilised by political 
challenges with the establishment of the European Economic Area (EEA) and the 
Swiss population's rejection to join it in 1992, which resulted in Switzerland 
remaining the only non-EEA member of the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA).91 Since then, Switzerland has followed a unique path of cooperation with the 
EU through the set up of 16 bilateral sectorial agreements between 1999 (first 
package) and 2004 (second package), linking the country closely to the EU Single 
Market and EU programmes.92 In order to ensure the compliance of Switzerland with 
the contentious Agreement on Free Movement of Persons (AFMP)93, a so-called 
guillotine clause was included in the first package giving a party the possibility to end 
all other agreements if the other party does not respect one of these agreements 
anymore.94 In 2008, the Federal Council (the Swiss government), called for the 
                                                
90  "Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Swiss Confederation", 
22.07.1972, Official Journal, L300, 31.12.1972, 189-280.  
91 René Schwok (2009), Switzerland - European Union: An Impossible Membership?, Brussels: P.I.E 
Peter Lang, 25-30. 
92 Ibid., 38 & 53-54.  
93 "Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the 
Swiss Confederation, of the other, on the free movement of persons - Final Act - Joint Declarations", 
Official Journal, L 114, 30.04.2002, 6-72. 
94 Sandra Lavenex & René Schwok, "The Swiss Way: The nature of Switzerland's relationship with 
the EU". In Eriksen, Erik O. & John Erik Fossum (Eds.) (2015), The European Union's Non-Members: 
Independency under hegemony?, London and New York: Routledge, 39. 
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negotiations of a third package of bilateral agreements, inter alia covering the areas of 
electricity and the EU ETS.95 However, since 2008, the EU repeatedly insisted on the 
fact that, before any further bilateral agreement can be concluded, an institutional 
framework agreement needs to be struck between the EU and Switzerland.96 The 
latter is officially under negotiation since May 2014.  
 With this general introduction to the state of the EU's relations with 
Switzerland, the extent of externalization of EU market-related rules in Switzerland 
can now be scrutinised.  
 
 
5.2 Liberalizing the Swiss electricity market: proactive legislative activity 
mitigated by referenda and institutional blockages with the EU  
5.2.1 Mid-1990s to 2002: Legislative activity towards acquis convergence 
From a sole legislative point of view, the importance of the European electricity 
market and the influence of EU policy developments on electricity in 1996 can be 
observed in the government’s political discourse as well as in the Federal Act on the 
Electricity Market (FAEM)97 adopted by Parliament in December 2000. 
 To begin with, from the mid-1990s on, the Swiss authorities clearly followed 
the European market integration agenda in the field of electricity by starting to set up 
the contours of Swiss market liberalisation with the reports "Opening of the electricity 
market" and "Opening of the electricity in the domain of electricity", which were 
published between 1995 and 1997, on the basis of consultations with public and 
private stakeholders from the electricity sector.98 The importance of the European 
                                                
95 Ibid.  
96 Council of the European Union, "Draft Council conclusions on EU relations with EFTA countries", 
Brussels, 05.12.2008, 16651/1/08 REV 1, 8; Council of the European Union, "Council conclusions on 
EU relations with EFTA countries", 3060th GENERAL AFFAIRS Council meeting Brussels, 
14.12.2010, 7; Council of the European Union, "3213th Council meeting: Transport, 
Telecommunications and Energy", Brussels, 20.12.2012, 17591/12, PRESSE 523 PR CO 76, 32; 
Council of the European Union, "Council conclusions on a homogeneous extended single market and 
EU relations with Non-EU Western European countries", General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 
16.12.2014, 7; Council of the European Union, "Council conclusions on EU relations with the Swiss 
Confederation", PRESS RELEASE 93/17, 28.02.2017, available online: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2017/2/47244655317_en.pdf, consulted the 
01.06.2017. 
97 "Federal Act on the Electricity Market", FF 2000, 15.12.2000, 5761-5773. 
98 Federal Council, "Message concernant la loi sur le marché de l’électricité (LME)", FF 99.055, 
07.06.1999, 6647. 
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electricity market and of the compatibility of Swiss legislation with "Directive 
96/92/EC" is highlighted in the message of the Federal Council concerning the 
FAEM.99 Indeed, according to the Swiss government, the liberalisation process as 
designed through the FAEM was explicitly drafted to be compatible with the afore-
mentioned Directive. 100  Furthermore, the Federal Council stresses the need to 
"prevent the isolation of the Swiss generation entities in Europe and to ensure them 
free access to the EU market"101. In addition, the Federal Council argues that the 
"retake of a large portion of EU regulations" is necessary to provide large industrial 
consumers in Switzerland with the same competitive advantage of lower market 
prices as their European competitors. 102 The regulatory state in the EU as well as the 
importance of the European electricity market, therefore heavily weighed in in the 
considerations of the Swiss legislator regarding the design of the FAEM, which was 
adopted in December 2000. The latter, regrouped the principal elements of the EU 
Directive with the requirement for undertakings to provide non-discriminatory third 
party access to the transmission network.103 The FAEM even went beyond the 
European Directive as it foresaw a complete opening of the Swiss electricity market 
until 2006, whereas EU Member States were only obliged to open their markets for 
34% of the market until 2004.104 This observation of a drive to realise a EU acquis-
compatible liberalisation process is underlined as well by the stakeholder analysis the 
scholars Jegen & Wüstenhagen realised regarding the project of market liberalisation 
in Switzerland in the late 1990s. 105  Indeed, they concluded that among all 
stakeholders related to the electricity policy and market, a great majority saw the 
compatibility with EU legislation as a top priority, overshadowing other goals such as 
efficiency and economic gains as a result of a price drop.106  Nonetheless, as it will be 
seen in the next section, several interest groups, notably the trade unions who 
                                                
99 Ibid., 6646-6740. 
100 Ibid., 6648.  
101  Unless stated otherwise, the quotations from documents of Swiss authorities and private 
stakeholders have been translated by the author. In Federal Council, "Message concernant la loi sur le 
marché de l’électricité (LME)", 6649. 
102 Federal Council, "Message concernant la loi sur le marché de l’électricité (LME)", 6650. 
103 FAEM, Art.5 & 8. 
104 Federal Council, "Message concernant la loi sur le marché de l’électricité (LME)", 6729. 
105 Maya Jegen & Rolf Wüstenhagen (2001), "Modernise it, sustainabilise it! Swiss energy policy on 
the eve of electricity market liberalisation", ELSEVIER, Energy Policy, 29, 45-54. 
106 Ibid., 47. 
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followed an anti-liberalisation agenda, made use of the optional referendum and 
compromised the market liberalisation project.  
 
5.2.2 The 2002 referendum, setback for electricity market liberalisation 
Although, the liberalisation of the electricity market was embraced by a majority of 
the political elite, a block of various interest groups, formed by smaller electricity 
companies, the socialist and green parties and most importantly the Swiss Federation 
of Trade Unions (SFTU), strongly opposed the FAEM and made use of the possibility 
to call for a referendum given by Art.34 of the latter.107 The SFTU, which was the 
most virulent opponent to the law, argued that the FAEM would result in a 
dysfunctional electricity market dominated by a few large suppliers who would abuse 
their market power.108 Regardless of the political compromise reached in parliament, 
52.6% of Swiss voters showed sympathy for these arguments and rejected the FAEM 
in September 2002. 109  While this setback suggests the failure of acquis 
approximation, the Swiss authorities made a second attempt to adapt electricity 
market conditions to EU regulation only two years later as a reaction to the second 
energy package pushing forward European market integration. 
 
5.2.3 Regulatory approximation finally adopted in 2007 
With the legislative developments in the EU, resulting in the adoption of the second 
energy package in 2004 and forcing Member States to fully open their electricity 
markets until 2007, the pressure to align with EU legislation became even more 
important and led to the adoption of the Federal Electricity Supply Act (FESA)110 in 
2007 creating a partially liberalised electricity market in Switzerland. Yet, full 
liberalisation, which was initially planed for 2013, has not become reality yet and 
                                                
107 Ian Bartle (2006), "Europeans outside the EU: Telecommunications and Electricity Reform in 
Norway and Switzerland", Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and 
Institutions, 19(3), 423-424. 
108 Adrian Zimmermann (2001), "La sécurité de l'approvisionnement ne doit pas être négligemment 
mise en danger: Non à la Loi sur le marché de l'électricité (LME)", Union Syndicale Suisse (USS), 14, 
25.  
109 Federal Chancellery, "Votation populaire du 22.09.2002", available online: 
https://www.admin.ch/ch/f/pore/va/20020922/index.html, consulted the 01.06.2017. 
110 "Federal Electricity Supply Act", RS 734.7, 23.03.2007, 1-18. 
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remains uncertain due to various factors such as blockages within the bilateral 
relations with the EU and the fear of a referendum in case of market opening.  
 To start with, albeit the Swiss population rejected the principle of market 
liberalisation only two years earlier, the Federal Council put liberalisation on the 
agenda again in 2003. One of the motivations of the executive was to re-establish 
regulatory order after the Federal Court's decision to apply the "Federal Act on 
Cartels" 111  to the sector of electricity in the case "Entreprises Electriques 
Fribourgeoises (EEF) contre Watt/Migros"112 creating a legal precedent for the free 
choice of electricity supplier for industrial consumers, without however providing any 
regulatory framework.113 The two other main motivations were more important with 
regards to our study. First, the Swiss authorities argued that market reforms were 
necessary due to legislative and regulatory developments in the EU.114 Second, they 
stressed that the increasing electricity cross-border trade developing with the EU, 
made it more and more crucial for the country in terms of security of supply to secure 
its market access through legislation.115 This shows that, with the upcoming complete 
liberalisation of the Member States' electricity markets until 2007 induced by the 
second energy package, the risk of being left out of the market was of great concern 
for Swiss policy-makers. Thus, through the FESA the Federal Council sought to 
secure "the position of Switzerland as electricity hub, the access to the European 
electricity market and international cooperation regarding security of supply"116. 
Concretely, the FESA gives large industrial consumers of more than 100 MWh per 
year the possibility to choose their supplier since October 2009. 117  Moreover, 
unbundling through the separation of accounting between transmission and other 
activities as well as third party access on a non-discriminatory basis had to be 
implemented by Swiss electricity companies.118 Furthermore, within this legislative 
context, a TSO was created in order to manage the operation and supervision of the 
                                                
111 "Federal Act on Cartels and other Restraints of Competition", RS 251, 06.10.1995, 1-22.   
112 Case "Entreprises Electriques Fribourgeoises (EEF) contre Watt/Migros" (ATF 129 II 497), 
17.06.2003. 
113 Federal Council, "Message relatif à la modification de la loi sur les installations électriques et à la 
loi fédérale sur l’approvisionnement en électricité", FF 04.083, 03.12.2004, 1499. 
114 Ibid., 1494. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid., 1500. 
117 International Energy Agency (IEA) (2007), "Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Switzerland 2007 
Review", OECD/IEA, Paris: IEA Publications, 77. 
118 FESA, Art.10 & 13.  
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transmission grid from 2006 on in a non-discriminatory and independent manner (it 
had to be in full possession of the Swiss transmission grid until 2013).119 Finally, the 
Electricity Commission (ElCom) was founded to monitor the new regulatory order.120 
With the FESA, major elements of the European electricity-market acquis such as the 
set up of an independent NRA and third party access to the transmission grid are met. 
Yet, full market liberalisation was not legally fixed but rather projected as a goal to be 
implemented in a second stage five years after the entry into force of the FESA 
through a Federal Decree with a possibility to call for a referendum.121  
 
5.2.4 EU acquis development and Swiss inability to follow the pace 
With the third energy package, the regulatory state was modified again, leading to the 
call for a revision of the FESA by the Federal Council in 2009.122 Within this context, 
parliamentary working groups raised concern about the current domestic regulatory 
incompatibility with EU legislation regarding the three models for legal unbundling of 
the TSO as well as the issue of distribution network unbundling enforced by 
"Directive 2009/72/EC".123 Yet, the revision process has been stalled due to the 
fundamental changes that the Swiss energy policy has been going through since the 
nuclear accident in Fukushima in March 2011. Indeed, it was decided the same year 
to gradually phase out nuclear power plants. In order to compensate the share of 
electricity production from these plants, which represented 37% of the Swiss 
electricity mix in 2012, the Federal Council formulated the "Energy Strategy 2050" in 
2013 by proposing a substantial increase of the electricity production from renewable 
energy sources (RES) as well as measures of enhanced energy efficiency.124 In 
September 2016, this strategy was translated into legislation through the Energy Act 
(EnA)125. However, until recently, the entry into force of the latter has been stuck in 
                                                
119 Ibid., Art.18-20. 
120 Ibid., Art.21-22. 
121 Ibid., Art.34, al.3. 
122 Federal Department for the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications - Federal Office 
of Energy (2010), "AG Unabhängigkeit/ schweizerische Beherrschung swissgrid AG: Schlussbericht", 
3.  
123 Ibid., 8-26, 
124 Federal Council, "Message relatif au premier paquet de mesures de la Stratégie énergétique 2050 
(Révision du droit de l’énergie) et à l’initiative populaire fédérale «Pour la sortie programmée de 
l’énergie nucléaire (Initiative ‹Sortir du nucléaire›)»", FF 13.074, 04.09.2013, 6775-6785. 
125 "Energy Act", FF 2016, 30.09.2016, 7469-7518. 
  Fegert - s1915517 
 25 
limbo as the right-wing Swiss People's Party, opposed to the phase-out of nuclear 
energy, launched a referendum on it. With the population's approval of the path taken 
by the authorities in the referendum of May 2017, the EnA and related legislation is 
planed to enter into force in early 2018.126 
 In addition, the acquis approximation process concerning the complete 
opening of the electricity market to free competition has been restrained by the same 
interest groups, which were already active in the early 2000s and are still opposed to 
it. Indeed, as expressed in October 2014, the SFTU is demanding the abandonment of 
the market-opening project as it still sees it as dangerous for the electricity sector and 
security of supply in general.127 Furthermore, in a stakeholder consultation issued by 
the Federal Office of Energy regarding the second step of complete market opening, it 
appeared that a majority of stakeholders asked the Swiss authorities to better 
coordinate the market opening with the "Energy Strategy 2050" and to harmonise it 
with the currently negotiated electricity agreement, which will be discussed below.128 
As a consequence, the Federal Council took the decision, in May 2016, to report the 
complete liberalisation of the electricity market and to reassess the legislative, 
political and economic context in 2017.129  
 
5.2.5 The need for a bilateral electricity agreement  
 This wait-and-see policy the Swiss authorities are currently playing started to 
affect negatively Switzerland's position within the European electricity market. 
Indeed, as from 2014 on, Switzerland was not allowed to participate in the market 
coupling with its European partners on the day-ahead market and the situation is 
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unclear as well for the planed European Intraday market platform "XBID".130 While 
Swissgrid is still able to cooperate with neighbouring TSOs on a bilateral basis, this is 
becoming more and more complicated as it is left out of the European market design 
process.131 Given the fact that yearly around 30 TWh/a of electricity transits through 
Switzerland, which as a comparison equals half of the Swiss electricity consumption, 
this is a source of major concern for electricity stakeholders as well as for the 
government.132  
 In order to avoid this situation and fix legally reciprocal electricity market 
access, Switzerland already launched negotiations on a bilateral electricity agreement 
with the EU in 2007.133 More precisely, the goal of the agreement is to ensure further 
legal certainty and regulatory recognition for future trans-border electricity trade.134 
This is of high importance for Switzerland as it is estimated to possess 20% of the 
cross-border capacity within the European grid.135 It is notably of high importance for 
ElCom to be accepted as a member in ACER in order to participate in the design of 
the network codes, shaping future market and grid design in the EU.136 The agreement 
also seeks to ensure continuous participation of Switzerland in EU energy policy-
making as it has been enabled to participate in informal meetings of the European 
energy ministers since 2009 as well as in the Florence forum on electricity with an 
observer status.137 However, since 2014 the EU has been denying this privileged 
access to Switzerland as it wants it to adopt further acquis-compatible measures such 
as full market liberalisation, the suppression of the priority given to long-term 
contracts in cross-border trade with France and the execution of REMIT. 138 
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Nonetheless, as illustrated above, full market liberalisation is stuck in limbo. This, 
inter alia, slowed down the negotiations of the electricity agreement. Additionally, 
the fact that the EU made conditional the signature of this bilateral agreement to the 
conclusion of an institutional framework agreement with Switzerland, as affirmed 
expressly by the former Commission's president Barroso in 2012, severely affected 
the negotiations as well.139  
 
 
5.3 EU ETS: completed acquis integration into domestic legislation, yet 
no market coupling so far  
 
Although the Swiss ETS, set up in 2008, was not directly acquis compatible, it was 
rapidly adapted to the EU ETS in order to gain market access. However, this access 
has not yet been granted. 
 
5.3.1 Beginnings of the Swiss ETS 
To start with, the Swiss ETS under its initial state must be seen in the context of the 
Federal Act on the reduction of CO2 emissions (CO2 Act)140, which entered into force 
in May 2000. With the main target to diminish Swiss GHG emissions by 10% 
compared to the 1990 level, the CO2 Act introduced a carbon tax for industries being 
responsible for most of the CO2 emissions and using fossil fuels.141 In this context, the 
Swiss ETS was created in 2008 as a system enabling companies to avoid this tax by 
receiving an allowance to emit CO2 in exchange of commitments to the reduce these 
emissions over time.142 Allowances could then be sold if the targeted reduction was 
surpassed or bought in the reverse case.143 It has been demonstrated by Schäfer that 
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Swiss policy-makers already had in mind a linkage with the EU ETS and sought 
compatibility between both systems since the mid-2000s.144  
 
5.3.2 Linking the Swiss emissions market to the EU market: a matter of 
competitiveness 
In the preparatory process of the revision of the Swiss ETS, an overwhelming 
majority of the stakeholders consulted by the Swiss authorities expressed their support 
for a coupling of the Swiss ETS with the European model.145 As a result, the Federal 
Council choose the option of EU-conform rule adoption through the revision of the 
CO2 Act, which was adopted in December 2011 and came into force in 2013.146 Thus, 
following the EU model, a genuine cap-and-trade system was adopted, and 
participation made mandatory for large GHG emitters for the 2013-2020 period.147 
Subsequently, the conditions for the free allocation of allowances as well as the 
sanctioning mechanism were adapted to the ones set up for the EU ETS.148 Finally, 
Switzerland imitated the 20% GHG emissions reduction goal fixed by the EU 2020 
climate and energy package by setting itself the same target-reduction for 2020.149 In 
the case of the EU emissions trading market, it can be asserted that Switzerland 
largely adapted its legislation in order to obtain market access. Economically, the 
Swiss move was motivated by the fact that, with only 55 participating companies, the 
Swiss ETS market was too small to enable genuine trade to happen.150 Furthermore, 
due to the fact that the European prices for emission allowances have consistently 
remained lower than the Swiss ones, Swiss firms were facing substantial "competitive 
disadvantage" towards the European concurrence.151  
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 Nonetheless, in order to enable market fusion, both partners needed to 
conclude a formal agreement mutually recognising emission allowances and fixing 
technicalities. The negotiations to link both systems were launched in spring 2011 and 
were finally concluded in January 2016.152 Yet the agreement still needs to be signed 
and ratified on both sides. Indeed, as seen in section 5.1, the conclusion of an 
institutional framework agreement is a pre-condition for the final conclusion of 
further agreements with the EU. 
 In summary, this chapter has shown that acquis approximation has been 
constantly on the agenda in Switzerland and is observable both for electricity and 
emissions trading. Yet, due to a series of blockages, this was only partially achieved 
for electricity and market linkage did not occur so far between the Swiss and EU ETS. 
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6. Ukraine 
 
Since its independence in 1991, Ukraine has been going through multiple economic 
and political crises, which have affected its energy policy. As it will be explained 
below, the externalization of market policies and regulations in the field of electricity 
liberalisation and carbon emissions mitigation has been more complicated in Ukraine 
than in Switzerland as the genuine implementation of political commitments has 
remained an issue until recently. Before discussing the results of the findings 
regarding energy acquis externalisation in Ukraine, it is useful to briefly recall the 
domestic political context in which the EU tried to develop stable bilateral relations 
from the mid-1990s onwards. 
 
 
6.1 Domestic political context and bilateral relations with the EU  
 
Throughout the presidency of the first elected president Kuchma (1994-2004), which 
largely shaped Ukraine's political landscape, the Ukrainian economic elite emerged as 
a crucial political player, which regrouped in so-called "oligarchic clans" and 
increasingly infiltrated the political system to ensure economic gains.153 A part of 
these clans also actively supported the "Orange Revolution", a massive pro-EU 
movement that opposed corruption and electoral fraud during the 2004 elections.154 
Indeed, an important part of the oligarchs backed reforms giving the parliament more 
power and, to a more limited extent, were also in favour of EU acquis 
approximation.155 This was motivated on the one hand by their desire to ensure their 
control over the political process (higher certainty through the Parliament) and, on the 
other hand, to attract desperately needed investments from the West to modernise the 
Ukrainian economy.156 Although the parliament was given more power, the "Orange 
Revolution" did not deliver the promised structural changes and in 2010, when 
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Yanukovych became president, the presidential power prerogatives were 
reaffirmed.157 
 With regards to the EU, its relations with Ukraine have for long been framed 
by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which was signed in 1994 and 
entered into force in 1998 with the aim to "provide an appropriate framework for 
political dialogue"158. Yet, at the time of the conclusion of the PCA, the EU's energy 
policy was still under discussion. Therefore, the provisions on the field of energy 
policy only stipulated that "cooperation shall take place", without mentioning clear 
goals and roadmaps.159 This began to change in 2005 when a "Memorandum of 
Understanding on cooperation in the field of energy" was signed and proposed for the 
first time a roadmap for the integration of Ukrainian electricity market into the EU's 
market.160 This cooperation was further intensified with the acceptation of Ukraine 
within the Energy Community in September 2010.161 Finally, the EU and Ukraine 
decided to upgrade and significantly deepen their relationship through the conclusion 
of an "Association Agreement"162 in 2012. After the initial refusal of Ukraine to sign 
the agreement in 2013, which lead to months of political turmoil and the departure of 
president Yanukovych, the new Ukrainian government finally signed the "Association 
Agreement" in mid-2014. Its official entry into force should occur in 2017 as the last 
Member State that hasn't ratified the agreement, namely the Netherlands, was able to 
reach a compromise over the ratification of the latter in Spring 2017.163  
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6.2 Electricity market liberalisation in Ukraine, late but considerable 
acquis approximation 
6.2.1 Electricity market liberalisation and de-liberalisation without EU influence 
Ukraine already adopted market liberalisation measures for its electricity sector at an 
early stage in the mid-1990s. Yet, these were not successful in setting up a 
functioning liberalised electricity market and, more importantly, no correlation 
between these measures and EU regulatory and legislative developments (first and 
second energy packages) could be found.  
 To begin with, contrary to the Swiss case, the first liberalisation wave that 
occurred in the EU after 1996, did not impact Ukrainian policy-making. Indeed, the 
liberalisation of the Ukrainian electricity sector was rather caused by internal 
economic problems, which resulted from the inherited obsolete Soviet infrastructure 
as well as from the sharp price increase of energy imports from 1992 onwards.164 The 
end of cheap energy import prices from Russia forced the government to subsidise the 
latter and almost led to state bankruptcy in 1994.165 International financial institutions, 
notably the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, helped Ukraine to 
avoid state insolvency but also conditioned their help to electricity market reforms.166  
 Therefore, and for economic reasons it was decided, per presidential decree in 
May 1994 and through several subsequent decrees, to modernise the sector and attract 
private investments. 167 In theory, a competition-friendly environment was set up 
through the creation of a National Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) and a 
state-owned TSO, which also controlled the National Dispatch Center, a market 
platform buying all electricity from generators and selling it then to the suppliers 
(applying either regulated or non-regulated tariffs).168 These market changes were 
eventually translated into law in 1997 with the "Law of Ukraine 'on Electric Power 
Industry'"169.  
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 It has been argued in the literature that the regulatory evolution within the 
Union did not play any role within these liberalisation reforms.170 Moreover, in reality 
the Ukrainian electricity market remained in a state of semi-liberalisation as the initial 
issues of non-competitive prices kept low through state subsidies, the development of 
barter in the electricity sector and problems of non-payment of Ukrenergo by an 
important part of the public and private end-consumers made the wholesale market 
rapidly un-transparent and prevented competition to develop.171 Additionally, the 
government exerted pressure on the regulatory authorities in order to keep the prices 
down.172 This is also partially explained by the opposition to market reforms of some 
influential oligarchs whose industries were benefiting from the subsidised electricity 
prices within the broken system.173 Many of these major issues remained in place for 
the following two decades.  
 Subsequently, legal approximation could not be observed in the electricity 
sector in the early 2000s although Ukraine adopted the "National Programme for 
Approximation of the Legislation of Ukraine of that of the European Union" in 
2003.174 On the contrary, in 2004 it was decided to re-centralise a majority of the non-
nuclear generation and distribution entities under the state-owned Energy Company of 
Ukraine, which gave the state control over the electricity sector back.175 It has been 
demonstrated by Hofer that these measures aimed at enhancing the government’s 
influence over the electricity sector and weakening the oligarchs, which were 
becoming increasingly powerful. 176 
 This changed from the mid-2000s on as the EU gained more and more interest 
in shaping Ukraine's regulatory framework in the field of energy and due to the 
growing importance of the European electricity market for Ukraine. 
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6.2.2 Increasing importance of EU model, yet lack of effective acquis approximation  
From the mid-2000s onwards, the EU regulatory state more and more clearly became 
the reference model for electricity market reforms as the goal to integrate the 
European electricity market began to appear as a lucrative option for electricity 
exports and the integration of the European single market as a whole an increasingly 
welcomed long-term goal.177 Moreover, the EU much more directly institutionalised 
the externalization of EU acquis from 2005 onwards first on a bilateral basis and then 
on a multilateral one through the Energy Community. Nonetheless, whereas 
commitments were rapidly formulated, Ukraine did not deliver the awaited 
comprehensive reforms for almost a decade. 
  To start with, the premises for the growing importance of the European 
electricity market for Ukrainian policy-makers in terms of exports and security of 
supply were already observable in September 2003 when the UCTE confirmed a 
permanent connection of the 'Burshtyn Island', to the European grid via Hungary, 
Slovakia (UCTE members at the time) and Romania.178 This first experiment of grid 
interconnection with the European grid was however a long-lasting process launched 
in 1995 and limited to a small part of Ukraine's Western power generation sector.179 
Indeed, the overwhelming majority of the Ukrainian grid has remained linked to 
Russia through the integrated power system (IPS/UPS), which possesses completely 
different technical, legal and organisational features than the European system.180 
 Nevertheless, the 'Burshtyn Island' experiment and the future electricity export 
opportunities acted as incentives for more concrete policy commitments from the 
Ukrainian authorities through the afore-mentioned "Memorandum of understanding 
on cooperation in the field of energy between the European Union and Ukraine" in 
December 2005, in which a clear roadmap for the integration of the EU's regulatory 
state was laid down.  
 These commitments were indeed followed by governmental and legislative 
activity with the overarching goal of making Ukrainian electricity market rules finally 
acquis-compatible. To begin with, an "Energy Strategy to 2030", highlighting the 
need to integrate the EU market and to expand electricity exports to the EU, was 
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approved by the Cabinet of Ministers in early 2006.181 Moreover, export rules were 
made more transparent in order to enable a competitive process to emerge around 
electricity exports.182 Yet, the most important issue from the European regulatory 
point of view remained the major structural problems inherited from the first wave of 
liberalisation. These began to be addressed with a planed major overhaul of the 
market design and regulatory state through the draft "Law on the Main Aspects of 
Functioning of the Electricity Market" (LFEM), which was adopted by the Cabinet of 
Ministers in 2007.183 Finally, a Presidential Decree improved the independence of the 
regulatory authority NERC in 2011.184  
 Subsequently, the EU asserted its position as an energy policy reference model 
by creating the Energy Community in 2006 with countries from South-Eastern 
Europe. 185  As defined in the "Energy Community Treaty" 186 , this highly 
institutionalised organization has as a main goal "to create a single regulatory space" 
in the field of energy, notably to enhance electricity trade between the EU and partner 
countries. 187 In order to achieve this goal, the "Energy Community Treaty" obliges 
the partner countries to integrate the relevant EU energy policy acquis within a fixed 
timetable.188 The institution has a permanent Secretariat, which reviews the adoption 
of energy acquis in each partner country, and possesses a Ministerial Council, which 
can notably extend the scope of the acquis to be implemented by the partner 
countries.189 Ukraine joined the Energy Community in 2010 and set up a roadmap as 
well as an action plan on acquis approximation in collaboration with the Secretariat 
between 2010 and 2011.190 Ukraine obliged itself to comply with the relevant acquis 
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on electricity, mainly legislation from the second energy package, by January 2012, 
with the exception of full market opening to all consumers, which had to be 
implemented by January 2015.191  
 However, all these formal commitments and declarations did not change much 
in practice and the reform process launched in the second half of the 2000s did not 
deliver concrete results for years. Indeed, the first assessments from the Secretariat 
over Ukraine's compliance with its obligations portrayed a poor regulatory state being 
"obsolete and requiring urgent reform".192 To begin with, the single buyer model was 
breaching "Directive 2003/54/EC" as it did not enable a competitive market to emerge 
and impeded free customer choice over their electricity supplier.193 Subsequently, 
another major bone of contention has been cross-border capacity allocation as 
Ukraine fails to comply with EU legislation and led the Secretariat to open an 
infringement procedure against it in 2013.194  
 Additionally, there was also little progress for many years regarding the goal 
to synchronise the whole Ukrainian grid with the European ENTSO-E grid as the 
process is still at an exploratory stage. Indeed, while it was estimated in 2011 that the 
synchronization would take around seven years195, more recent estimations from a 
feasibility study held by ENTSO-E from November 2014 until October 2015, foresaw 
a much longer process, which could take up until 10 years.196.  
 It must also be acknowledged that the chaotic political situation, of the second 
half of the 2000s with internal disputes within the pro-EU camp as well as the 
comeback to a presidential system in 2010 under Yanukovych, who did follow an 
opportunistic agenda by adopting an ambiguous position towards EU-policy 
convergence relatively often, also negatively affected acquis approximation.197  
 Nevertheless, as it will be seen in the next section, the externalization of core 
electricity market-acquis has finally started to occur since 2013. 
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6.2.3 Pivotal years for Ukraine's European future and electricity market reforms 
Between 2013 and 2014, major steps were taken with regards to EU market-rule 
conformity as the long-awaited market reform was finally adopted and the 
"Association Agreement" signed by the Poroshenko government one month after its 
assumption of power in July 2014.198  
 To begin with, a major step towards EU acquis compatibility was made in 
October 2013 with adoption of the LFEM more than 15 years after the last major 
electricity market reform. The LFEM fixes a gradual phasing out of the single buyer 
model, which will be replaced by a day-ahead market platform and bilateral trading 
until July 2017.199 Moreover, the law guarantees third party access, regulates cross-
border transmission capacities and plans the set up of an electronic auctioning 
platform.200  
 Subsequently, Ukraine signed the "Association Agreement" with the EU in 
July 2014, deepening its relationship with it even further. Indeed, this agreement 
covers almost all sectors of the Single Market and streamlines the main measures to 
take in order to be able to join the latter. From an institutional point of view an 
Association Council, meeting at the ministerial level, is created and given the right to 
adopt binding decisions. 201  Regarding acquis approximation, the "Association 
Agreement" is much more precise than the PCA as it is written that "Ukraine will 
carry out gradual approximation of its legislation to EU law".202 For electricity market 
liberalisation, the content is also precisely defined with provisions demanding third 
party access, the establishment of an independent NRA and market prices for 
electricity as well as compliance with relevant legislation from the second energy 
package.203  
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200  International Energy Agency (IEA) (2015), "Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia", 
OECD/IEA, Paris: IEA Publications, 343. 
201 "ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT between the European Union and its Member States, of the one 
part, and Ukraine, of the other part", Art.461. 
202 Ibid., Art.474. 
203 Ibid., Art.269, 273, 277 & Annex XXVII. 
  Fegert - s1915517 
 38 
 In the same vein, the Secretariat of the Energy Community is becoming more 
and more proactive regarding domestic "law shaping" in Ukraine. Indeed, as in 2011 
the third energy package was incorporated in the acquis corpus to be implemented by 
Energy Community members into national law before January 2015, the Secretariat 
prepared a new third energy package-conform draft "Electricity Market Law" and 
directly presented it to the Ukrainian Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry in July 
2014.204 The "Electricity Market Law" has been approved by the Parliament in April 
2017.205 The latter fixes pending issues in order to make Ukrainian legislation fully 
acquis-compatible in the field of electricity. Thus, the TSO Ukrenergo will follow the 
ownership unbundling model laid down in the third energy package and different 
market aspects, which were non-compliant with EU legislation, will be completed.206 
The Secretariat has been equally involved in the drafting of the "Law on the National 
Commission for the Regulation of Energy and Utilities", which entered into force in 
November 2016 and marks a crucial step as it makes the Ukrainian NRA's 
competences acquis-compatible by giving it the necessary independence from the 
political interest groups.207   
 Finally, the reform process needs to be reframed again within the Ukrainian 
political context. Indeed, the fact that Poroshenko, the successor of Yanukovych who 
came into power in 2014, has been a fierce pro-EU oriented oligarch since the early 
2000s clearly impacted the reform pace as well.208 
 Although the transposition of the adopted laws in secondary legislation is still 
ongoing and implementation will take time, Ukraine is finally delivering tangible 
results in terms of electricity market-acquis approximation. 
 
 
 
                                                
204 Energy Community Secretariat (2015), "ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION REPORT 2014/2015", 
11 & 204. 
205 CMS, "Ukraine: Electricity Market liberalised to meet the EU 3rd Energy Package requirements", 
18.04.2017, available online: http://www.cms-lawnow.com/ealerts/2017/04/ukraine-electricity-market-
liberalised-to-meet-the-eu-3rd-energy-package-requirements, consulted the 10.06.2017. 
206 Energy Community Secretariat (2016), "ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION REPORT 2015/2016", 
Vienna, 160. 
207 Energy Community, "REGULATORY AUTHORITY", available online: https://www.energy-
community.org/implementation/Ukraine/REG.html, consulted the 29.06.2017. 
208 Sakwa (2016), Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands, 64-65. 
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6.3 Creating of a domestic ETS, a recent and EU-driven project 
 
Unlike for the electricity sector, emissions trading was a low-priority on the political 
agenda in Ukraine until recently and it were merely the provisions from the 
"Association Agreement" which pushed forward Ukraine's plan to establish a national 
emissions trading market. However, several elements are still lacking to enable the set 
up of such a market in the short-run and it is uncertain whether legislation will follow 
soon. 
 
6.3.1 Climate change action in Ukraine: a low priority 
From its independence on until the end of the 2000s, Ukraine's commitment to the 
fight against climate change and carbon emissions has remained very limited.  
 To start with, Ukraine did not have to implement any specific measures in the 
1990s and early 2000s to meet its Kyoto Protocol target goal of not exceeding its 
GHG emissions compared to the 1990 level as its emissions dropped permanently by 
more than 50% since 1990 due to structural changes within the post-Soviet economy 
as well as economic recessions.209 However, the Ukrainian economy has remained 
extremely energy intensive with a GHG emissions intensity compared to the GDP 
level that was estimated to be four times higher than the European average in 2010.210 
Therefore, there is immense potential for emissions reduction. Even though some 
merely declaratory policy-goals were defined in the second half of the 2000s, this has 
however, not been high on the policy-agenda until recently,.211 Indeed, the "Energy 
Strategy of Ukraine to 2030", which was formulated in 2006 and updated in 2013, 
aimed at addressing the issue of obsolescent power plants but did not present any 
clear roadmap or specific targets to be implemented.212 Thus, the set up of the EU 
ETS in 2005 did not impact policy-making with regards to decarbonisation and 
emissions trading. 
 
                                                
209 State Environmental Investment Agency (2014), "MARKET READINESS PROPOSAL Under the 
Partnership for Market Readiness Programme: UKRAINE", Partnership for Market Readiness, 23-24. 
210 Ibid., 26. 
211 ADE (2010), "Evaluation of the European Commission’s Cooperation with Ukraine: Final Report", 
ADE (Analysis for Economic Decisions), 57. 
212 State Environmental Investment Agency (2014), "MARKET READINESS PROPOSAL", 41. 
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6.3.2 The "Association Agreement": enforced proposals lacking a realistic roadmap 
 The set up of a domestic ETS was first discussed in 2010 but only became 
concreter with the growing institutionalisation of the relationship with the EU. 
However, there has been no legislative proposal yet. 
 Although, a domestic ETS has been under discussion since 2010213, Ukraine 
was finally pushed by the EU to commit to a clear roadmap with target deadlines for 
the implementation of emissions trading at a domestic level. Indeed, according to the 
"Association Agreement", Ukraine has to implement a domestic ETS based on the EU 
ETS model within two years.214 However, the Ukrainian roadmap seems unclear, as 
the authorities have expressed different objectives and target headlines so far. On the 
one hand, in the draft "Energy Strategy of Ukraine through 2035" from 2014, it is 
foreseen to introduce a domestic ETS until 2035 in a third stage, which is preceded by 
two stages setting up a "carbon tax". 215  On the other hand, the Ministry of 
Environment issued a draft concept in 2015 for a trading scheme that would be based 
on the EU ETS and established in 2017 for a four-year pilot phase.216 Following the 
ministry's plans, the scheme would be linked with the EU ETS in 2019 in order to 
avoid problems of liquidity on the small Ukrainian carbon allowance market.217 These 
two completely different roadmaps portray an unclear agenda when it comes to 
climate mitigating action. Moreover, no legislation on emissions trading has been 
adopted yet.218  
 To briefly summarise this chapter, it can be said that until recently, acquis 
externalization was highly limited in Ukraine. This changed since 2013 with the 
                                                
213 Preparedness for Emissions Trading in the EBRD Region (PETER), "Preparedness for Emissions 
Trading in the EBRD Region", available online: 
http://www.ebrdpeter.info/uploads/media/report/0001/01/57173c6fa42b5056e876770b042c1e96b1f92b
35.pdf, consulted the 15.06.2017. 
214 "ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT between the European Union and its Member States, of the one 
part, and Ukraine, of the other part", ANNEX XXX. 
215  "ENERGY STRATEGY OF UKRAINE through 2035: WHITE BOOK OF UKRAINIAN 
ENERGY POLICY SECURITY AND COMPETITIVENESS", (2014), draft, 28, available online: 
http://www.enercee.net/fileadmin/enercee/images-2016/Ukraine/Energy_strategy_2035_eng.pdf, 
consulted the 02.06.2017.  
216 International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP), "Ukraine Plans National ETS for 2017", available 
online: https://icapcarbonaction.com/fr/news-archive/310-ukraine-plans-national-ets-for-2017, 
consulted the 20.05.2017. 
217 Ibid. 
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adoption of major electricity market reforms. Concerning emissions trading at a 
domestic level, no tangible acquis approximation could be observed so far.  
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7. Analysis of the findings and theoretical implications for MPE  
 
The findings on Switzerland and Ukraine reflect a mixed picture regarding MPE. 
Indeed, on the one hand, to a large extent, there is hard evidence of the EU's shaping 
role of both countries’ electricity and emissions trading policies and legislation. Yet, 
on the other hand contextual and domestic factors, namely the level of market 
interconnectedness, the nature of the political system, the level of institutionalisation 
of the bilateral relationship with the EU and the political culture, appear to 
significantly impact acquis approximation in both cases. In this chapter, the findings 
for both cases will first be analysed. Second, theoretical conclusions for MPE will be 
drawn. 
 
 
7.1 Switzerland: A clear case of EU market power with ongoing obstacles 
 
 The findings from the first case study on Switzerland, which is a most-likely 
case and should confirm the MPE theory, are highly interesting as, they partially 
corroborate the latter by confirming the EU's position as a market power in 
Switzerland, but also highlight some major mitigating factors to this power.  
 
7.1.1 Market power evidence in the case of Switzerland 
On the one hand, the EU demonstrated market power features as Swiss authorities 
have been, since the mid-1990s attentive to EU legislative changes and showed great 
willingness to adapt Swiss legislation in a EU-conform way in order to avoid being 
left out of the European electricity market. This could already be observed at the early 
stage of the European regulatory process with the adoption of the FAEM in 2000, 
suggesting an important market power of the EU in the field of electricity towards 
Switzerland. While this first attempt, was rejected by the citizens in 2002 per 
referendum, Switzerland finally partially liberalised its electricity market in 2007 
through the FESA and adopted important measures defined in EU legislation such as 
the creation of an independent NRA and a TSO guaranteeing non-discriminatory third 
party access to the transmission grid. Subsequently, an even clearer pattern of EU-
conform rule adoption could be observed in the case of the EU ETS as Switzerland 
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completely redesigned its ETS in 2011 in order to be able to integrate the European 
market.  
 The size and importance of the European electricity and carbon emissions 
markets was paramount in the Swiss case. Indeed, market access to the European 
electricity market has been crucial regarding security of supply and given the fact that 
Switzerland is a hub for Western European electricity trade. This has become even 
more important with the Swiss decision to base its energy mix increasingly on RES 
through the "Energy Strategy 2050". Indeed, as argued by Swissgrid, this strategy 
makes the integration of the EU electricity market even more important for 
Switzerland as a higher share of RES will also mean less reliability within the Swiss 
grid and higher interdependence with the European one.219 Furthermore, preventing 
Swiss companies from facing competitive disadvantage was another major concern in 
Switzerland, both concerning the European electricity and ETS markets.  
 Therefore, the relative market size and evolving regulatory state within the EU 
have been important explaining variables of the EU's market power in Switzerland. 
Interest contestation could also be identified as an important characteristic of EU 
market power, however within the domestic political arena. 
 
7.1.2 Yet, incomplete acquis approximation  
On the other hand, the picture is not as clear-cut as it was initially expected. Indeed, 
electricity market liberalisation acquis could not be fully externalised and, more than 
20 years after the European electricity market project was launched, some major 
features such as the complete opening of the electricity market to competition are not 
in place in Switzerland.  
 To begin with, the Swiss voters rejected the liberalisation of the electricity 
market in 2002 as domestic interest groups, opposed to the liberalisation project, used 
the tools given by the semi-direct democratic system to undermine the parliamentary 
consensus over acquis approximation. In the last years, this political tool has been 
equally impacting acquis externalization as the facultative referendum is still hanging 
as a Damocles sword over the second step of complete electricity market opening, 
                                                
219 Swissgrid (2012), "Integration der Schweiz in das europäische Stromnetz: Für eine sichere und 
wirtschaftlich Stromversorgung", available online: 
https://www.swissgrid.ch/dam/swissgrid/company/publications/de/Integration_CH_EU_Stromnetz_de.
pdf, consulted the 05.05.2017. 
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which has not been scheduled by legislation yet. This retard, was also motivated by 
the fact that the adoption of the "Energy Strategy 2050" was not guaranteed until May 
2017, when the Swiss citizens finally validated the EnA per referendum.  
 Subsequently, the initiative "against mass immigration" accepted in February 
2014 also put under great strain the whole institutional bilateral structure, which was 
set up in the early 2000s between the EU and Switzerland and with it further 
integration of Switzerland within the EU electricity and emissions trading markets. 
Indeed, after the approval by the Swiss voters of this initiative demanding the set up 
of quotas on EU immigration, the EU significantly paced down its cooperation with 
Switzerland, as the initiative was potentially breaching the AFMP and as a 
consequence jeopardizing the whole bilateral cooperation structure between the EU 
and Switzerland (cf. guillotine clause discussed in chapter seven).220 Finally, the 
adoption of a watered down form of implementation of the initiative by the parliament 
in December 2016, ensured the respect of the principle of free movement of persons 
and normalised the bilateral relationship.221 
 Finally, the lack of a comprehensive institutional agreement has decisively 
blocked the conclusion of a bilateral electricity agreement which should ensure 
Switzerland more legal certainty regarding its participation within the European 
electricity market. Moreover, the linkage of the Swiss and European ETS has not been 
realised neither for this reason although an agreement was already reached in January 
2016.  
 
7.1.3 Uncertainty regarding the EU's market powers' strength to overcome mitigating 
factors 
Certainly, this rigid position of the EU, conditioning the conclusion of any new 
bilateral agreement to greater institutionalization of the overall relationship with 
Switzerland, is an attempt to exert market power. Additionally, the strain that is put 
on the Swiss authorities by the EU through the exclusion of it from institutional 
structures and from unhindered access to the EU market shows the increasing market 
                                                
220 Solenn Paulic, "L’Union européenne desserre l’étau sur la libre circulation", 22.12.2016, Le Temps, 
available online: https://www.letemps.ch/suisse/2016/12/22/lunion-europeenne-desserre-letau-libre-
circulation, consulted the 01.06.2017 
221 Ibid. 
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power the EU is exerting on its partners. Yet, it is less certain whether this will be 
successful and at what pace negotiations will evolve.  
 To conclude the analysis of the findings for Switzerland it can be said that 
MPE could be verified partially, as core EU acquis in the field of electricity and 
emissions trading was adopted in Switzerland and as the EU globally shaped Swiss 
energy policy. Nonetheless, the possibility to use referenda against agreed legislation 
and the absence of an institutional agreement on electricity as well as the lack of an 
overall framework agreement between Switzerland and the EU have created great 
legal uncertainty resulting in incomplete acquis approximation. 
 
 
7.2 Late but tangible market power exerted towards Ukraine 
 
The findings for Ukraine, our least-likely case, are noteworthy as well. Indeed, while 
for long Ukraine's commitments towards EU membership and the related promises of 
acquis adoption remained of a rhetorical nature, acquis externalization has occurred 
in recent years. Indeed, substantial legislative reforms of the electricity sector began 
to be adopted from 2013 onwards due to domestic factors and institutional 
developments within the bilateral relationship with the EU. The situation has been 
more critical regarding the domestic ETS, as a lack of shared political culture has 
limited rapid legislative developments so far. 
 
7.2.1 Early EU-regulatory stage: absence of tangible market power  
The EU did not appear as a market power towards Ukraine until the mid-, perhaps late 
2000s. This is explained by the lack of initial interconnectedness to the EU electricity 
market and the absence of equal values on climate change mitigation action with 
regards to emissions trading regulation. Additionally, the loose institutional 
relationship with the EU and the domestic political system also explain the absence of 
acquis approximation. 
 To begin with, it could be noticed that, until the mid-2000s, EU market rules 
played no role at all in the attempted electricity market liberalisation process put into 
motion by president Kuchma in the mid-1990s. The reversal of the incomplete market 
liberalisation in 2004 per presidential decree, demonstrates the lack of influence of the 
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EU's regulatory order in Ukraine, as it appeared that the second energy package did 
not impact domestic policy-developments. Moreover, as demonstrated by Hofer, the 
re-centralization measures aimed at restraining the oligarchs' power by enhancing the 
government’s influence over the electricity sector.222 This portrays how vulnerable the 
presidential system made Ukraine's political system towards fluctuations within the 
president's agenda.  
 Further, Ukraine's market access to the EU electricity market has remained 
very limited. Although in 2003 the "Burshtyn Island" was synchronised with the 
UCTE grid, progress of the planed complete interconnection of the Ukrainian grid has 
been very slow as the exploratory phase has been barley completed so far. These 
uncertainties regarding grid interconnection with the EU undoubtedly affected the 
reform pace in Ukraine and thus the EU's market power. 
 Subsequently, the loosely institutionalised relations between the EU and 
Ukraine until 2005, perhaps 2010, equally negatively impacted EU energy policy 
approximation. This is notably reflected within the PCA, which barely specified 
regulations to be adopted,  
 Finally, no rule approximation with the EU ETS regulations was envisaged in 
Ukraine until recently as climate change mitigation action was by far not a national 
priority. 
 
7.2.2 Acquis approximation patterns and tangible results emerging at last 
In the last years, EU acquis approximation could finally be observed as the EU slowly 
build up the necessary conditions for the deployment of its market power in Ukraine 
from the mid-2000s on. This remarkable exercise of market power within the least-
likely case Ukraine can be mainly explained through structural changes within the 
institutional relationship between both partners and, to a lesser extent, by changes 
within the political system. 
 To start with, it could be demonstrated that the weakening of the president's 
power which resulted from the 'Orange Revolution' in 2004, was supported by a 
majority of oligarchs with the objective of guaranteeing their grip on the political 
process and securing minimum acquis approximation in order to attract foreign 
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investors and enlarge export opportunities.223 After a chaotic period and a comeback 
to the presidential system under Yanukovych, these reforms were finally consolidated 
in 2014 under the new president Poroshenko, a firmly pro-EU oligarch. Due to the 
changes within the political system giving the parliament more power, the country is 
less vulnerable to drastic policy changes, which could affect acquis externalization in 
the past. 
 Subsequently, two main developments within the EU-Ukraine relationship led 
to EU-rule adoption and confirmed some EU market power at a later stage: the 
conclusion of the "Association Agreement" and the entry of Ukraine within the 
Energy Community. First, the "Association Agreement" substantially stabilised 
bilateral relations and secured long-term integration within the Single Market as clear 
timely framed commitments of acquis adoption were formulated and an institutional 
structure was set up. Second, with the Energy Community, the EU is increasingly 
asserting itself as a market power in the field of energy policy. Indeed, through the 
Energy Community Secretariat, the EU is more and more closely monitoring the 
Ukrainian legislative process and even pre-writing acquis-conform legislation for 
Ukraine. This was notably perceivable regarding the electricity market reforms, which 
were adopted between 2013 and early 2017 in Ukraine. This remarkable influence of 
the EU on the Ukrainian legislative process is a genuine demonstration of market 
power and shows that, once the institutional relationship with Ukraine became more 
precise, reform process was substantially accelerated. 
 Finally, the findings demonstrate weak legal approximation regarding the set 
up of a Ukrainian EU-conform ETS as the strategy is unclear and no tangible results 
have been implemented yet. Given that the goal to set up a national ETS has mainly 
been imposed by the EU through the "Association Agreement" and that climate 
change mitigation has consistently been a low priority for Ukraine, it can be argued 
that the absence of shared values on decarbonisation has been mitigating acquis 
approximation. 
 
 
                                                
223 Melnykovska & Schweickert (2008), "Bottom-up or top-down", 450-456. 
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7.3 Theoretical implications: domestic context and institutional relations 
with the EU matter 
 
With regards to MPE, my findings and subsequent analysis have important 
implications as they show that although the theory is verified to a certain extent, it 
needs to be sharpened as it is qualified by certain factors, which are not taken into 
account by the three MPE characteristics of relative market size, regulatory capacity 
and interest contestation. Indeed, four intervening variables have been identified as 
affecting the extent to which MPE is able to account for energy acquis 
externalization: the level of interconnectedness with the EU market, the political 
culture, the nature of the political system and the level of institutionalization of the 
EU's bilateral relations with a third country. The related empirical findings, described 
earlier are summarised in Table 7.1. Finally, my findings demonstrated that the MPE 
characteristic of interest contestation should be broadened to the domestic political 
arena.  
 
  
Intervening Variables Switzerland 
a. Electricity market  
b. ETS 
Ukraine 
a. Electricity market  
b. ETS 
 
Level of market interconnectedness  
 
a. High 
b. Does Not Apply (DNA) 
 
a. Low 
b. Does Not Apply (DNA) 
 
Level of similarity between domestic 
and EU norms 
 
a. Moderate 
b. High 
 
a. Moderate 
b. Low 
 
Constitutional possibility to interfere 
within domestic consensus over 
acquis approximation 
 
a+b. Yes 
 
 
a+b. Yes (until 2006 & 2010-14)    
 
 
Level of institutionalization of EU-
third country relations 
 
a. Low 
b. Low 
 
a. Low (until 2010) 
b. Low (until 2014) 
 
  
Table 7.1 Variables affecting MPE's explanatory strength 
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 To begin with, the level of interconnectedness with the EU market could be 
identified as a crucial factor influencing the ability of MPE to explain acquis 
approximation in the field of electricity in Switzerland and Ukraine. Indeed, the fact 
that electricity trade patterns between the EU and Switzerland were already highly 
developed in the mid-1990s guaranteed that the regulatory changes and the resulting 
creation of the European electricity market impacted domestic policy-making from 
the very beginning and resulted in partial regulatory approximation from 2007 on. 
This was by far not the case in Ukraine as the electricity market completely lacked 
interconnection with the European grid until 2003. Moreover, electricity trade 
interests have been hampered for long by a slow assessment process of complete grid 
synchronization, only planed for 2025. This impeded the effective deployment of EU 
market power from the mid-1990s on. As a result the findings from the 
"Europeanization beyond Europe" literature discussed in chapter three are verified, as 
market interconnection is an important factor impacting acquis externalization in third 
countries. It has to be acknowledged, however, that this variable was not relevant for 
the EU ETS as market interconnection can only occur once the regulatory framework 
is in place and has been recognised by the EU as such. 
 Subsequently, the domestic political culture, more precisely the level of 
similarity between domestic and EU norms, could be identified as impacting the 
explanatory strength of MPE, notably regarding climate change mitigation action. 
Indeed, while a domestic ETS was rapidly implemented in Switzerland and made 
acquis-conform, Ukraine has only launched an emissions trading market project 
recently without any tangible results so far. This can mainly be explained by the fact 
that regarding, the goal of decarbonisation, Switzerland and the EU already shared a 
similar rationale since the late 1990s as they both committed to reduce their GHG 
emissions by 8% compared to the 1990 level under the Kyoto protocol.224 Meanwhile, 
climate change mitigation has never been a top priority in Ukraine policy-making. 
Concerning electricity market liberalisation, the similarity between domestic and EU 
norms can be qualified as moderate. Indeed, although the national authorities have 
been committed to EU norms of market liberalisation in the Swiss case, the fact that 
influent interest groups opposed these, clearly influenced acquis approximation.  In 
Ukraine as well the fact that in the 1990s certain economic circles did not share EU 
                                                
224 "KYOTO PROTOCOL TO THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE", Kyoto, 11.12.1997, United Nations, Treaty Series, 2303, 255-256.  
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norms on liberalisation, fearing the loss of local monopolies, participated in the lack 
of acquis approximation at that time. These findings on the relevance of norm 
similarity for acquis externalization partially challenge the findings within the 
"Europeanization beyond Europe" literature discussed in chapter three. 
 Further, the nature of the political system, more specifically the constitutional 
possibility given to stakeholders to interfere within the domestic consensus over 
acquis approximation, also acted as an important filter of MPE. Indeed, both the 
semi-direct democratic system in Switzerland and the presidential system in Ukraine 
made it possible to stakeholders to affect acquis approximation. First, the optional 
referendum and the right of initiative, guaranteed by the Swiss constitution225, could 
be identified as jeopardizing the parliamentarian consensus reached upon acquis 
approximation. As observed, these democratic tools hindered electricity market 
reforms several times and impacted negatively sectorial and institutional cooperation 
with the EU. This variable also applies to a lesser degree for Ukraine, where the 
president had extensive power prerogatives until 2006 and from 2010 to 2014, which 
resulted in important policy shifts moving Ukraine's regulatory order away from EU 
norms.  
 The last intervening variable, which strongly impacted effective EU regulatory 
transfer both in Switzerland and Ukraine is the level of institutionalization of the 
bilateral relations between the EU and a given third country. Indeed, in the Swiss 
case, the absence of a framework agreement governing issues such as dynamic acquis 
integration, homogeneous interpretation of existing agreements and dispute 
settlement, substantially reduced complete acquis externalization.226 This has not only 
hindered the linkage of the Swiss and EU emissions trading markets albeit an 
agreement was reached more than a year ago, but is also blocking the electricity 
agreement under negotiation since 2007. The latter is essential for Switzerland to 
ensure legal certainty regarding access to the European electricity market and the 
recognition of regulatory compatibility with EU standards.227 Therefore, this uncertain 
sectorial and institutional framework conditions are negatively affecting further 
acquis externalization in Switzerland. In the Ukrainian case, the institutionalisation of 
                                                
225 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, RS 101, 18.04.1999, Art. 139 & 141. 
226 For the demands of the EU regarding the institutional framework agreement, see: Council of the 
European Union, "Negotiating mandate for an EU-Switzerland institutional framework agreement", 
Brussels, 06.05.2014, 9525/14 (OR. en), PRESSE 267, 1. 
227 IEA (2012), "Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Switzerland", 95-100. 
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cooperation with the EU in the field of energy policy through its participation in the 
Energy Community since 2010 and more broadly through the "Association 
Agreement" signed in 2014, considerably fostered acquis-conform electricity market 
reforms. Indeed, through clearly defined roadmaps, genuine market-access prospects 
and well-developed institutional structures, the EU is more and more directly shaping 
the Ukrainian regulatory order. Therefore, it can be argued that the more 
institutionalised and legally defined the cooperation and acquis integration is defined 
with a third country, the more MPE can provide a satisfying theoretical tool to explain 
acquis externalization. 
 Finally, my findings demonstrate that while interest contestation must indeed 
be considered as a characteristic of EU market power, the domestic political arena 
needs to be taken into account. Indeed, in both cases pro- and anti-acquis 
approximation interest groups were active within the domestic political arena, be it 
the trade unions in Switzerland or oligarchic clans in Ukraine. Damro only 
acknowledges the role of foreign interest groups in the European political arena.228 
Therefore, I suggest broadening the scope of the interest contestation characteristic to 
the domestic political arena.  
 
 
 
  
                                                
228 Damro (2012), "Market power Europe", 689. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
The European Union's market and regulatory order are indisputably key attributes of 
its power. Yet, the answer to our initial question whether the EU can be characterised 
as a market power in the area of energy policy is a qualified yes. Although, it was 
discovered that the EU shaped national energy policy in both case studies, the length 
and incomplete nature of this process both in Switzerland and Ukraine have 
demonstrated that the EU's market power is filtered by factors related to domestic 
structures and culture as well as to the EU's institutional and economic links with 
third countries. This has far-reaching implications for MPE as it provides the theory 
with valuable empirical insight that will help to make it more resilient when applied 
in practice.  
 To begin with, in chapter four, the potential market power as defined by MPE 
could be identified as strong as an ever more complete regulatory state has been 
designed regarding central objectives of EU energy policy, namely electricity market 
integration and decarbonisation through emissions trading. First, a common electricity 
market was created gradually through the liberalisation of the Member States' 
electricity markets throughout the three energy packages (1996, 2003, 2009). This 
liberalisation process was also accompanied by the establishment of a strong 
"regulatory capacity" with the creation of ACER, further EU-wide coordination 
between TSO's through ENTSO-E and clear rules on unbundling of transmission 
networks. Second, it was displayed that an emissions trading market and strong 
"regulatory capacity" has been in place since 2005 with the EU ETS, which was 
reformed in 2009 and 2015. As for the MPE characteristic of interest contestation, its 
assessment was hindered by the difficulty to access necessary information. This 
difficulty should be taken into account in further empirical studies of MPE. 
Nonetheless, it could be concluded that according to MPE, the EU's market power 
should be extensive. 
 Subsequently, it was assessed in chapter five and six whether EU energy 
acquis approximation occurred in Switzerland and Ukraine respectively. Both case 
studies provided highly interesting insides on MPE's strength to account for the EU's 
ability to externalise its regulatory order in its neighbourhood. 
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 In the Swiss case it was found that overall, the EU's market power has been 
substantial regarding electricity liberalisation and emissions trading. Indeed, since the 
beginning of EU energy policy-making, acquis approximation has always remained 
high on the Swiss political agenda as access to both the European electricity and 
carbon emissions markets was crucial for Switzerland in terms of trade, 
competitiveness and security of supply (for electricity only). For the Swiss ETS, 
which was made acquis compatible, the fact that both partners followed similar goals 
in terms of climate change mitigation played a crucial role as well.  
 Nonetheless, regarding electricity market liberalisation various obstacles have 
made EU acquis approximation more challenging than initially expected by this most-
likely case. Indeed, acquis approximation regarding the electricity market was first 
stopped in 2002 per referendum and has not been achieved so far as the complete 
market liberalisation has been postponed several times. Additionally, legislative 
reform aiming, inter alia, at ensuring complete regulatory compatibility with the third 
energy package, has been stalled as well. The principal causes for this incomplete 
acquis externalization lies within the direct-democratic system and the absence of a 
comprehensive institutional agreement with the EU, which created an uncertain legal 
and political environment. Under the present circumstances of a consistent opposition 
to further integration of Switzerland within the European regulatory order by the 
Swiss Peoples Party (currently the strongest party in Switzerland), it remains 
uncertain whether these structural problems will be resolved soon.   
 In the Ukrainian case, it could be observed that the EU's role as a market 
power was only perceivable from the mid-2000s on, notably due to the absence of 
market interconnection in the area of electricity. First, the EU did not play any role 
within the country's first wave of market liberalisation in the mid-1990s, which was in 
fact not acquis-compatible. Second, from the mid-2000s until 2013 followed a long 
phase of declaratory pro-EU commitments globally lacking substance and effective 
implementation. However, in the last years the EU has been able to externalise its 
energy acquis more and more effectively, notably through the creation of the Energy 
Community and the conclusion of an Association Agreement with Ukraine. 
Eventually, the EU was therefore able to externalise its acquis given that fundamental 
electricity market reforms were adopted between 2013 and early 2017. For emissions 
trading it was found that the absence of shared values on decarbonisation, highly 
deteriorated the EU's market power.  
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 These findings lead to the conclusion that while MPE provides a good 
framework to analyse the EU's ability to externalise its regulatory order in 
neighbouring countries, multiple variables act as filters to the deployment of market 
power. Indeed, four intervening variables need to be considered when applying MPE 
in practice in order to make it well-suited for non-trade areas and more resilient in 
general: the level of market interconnectedness with the third country, the proximity 
of this country's political culture with EU norms, the nature of the political system of 
that country and the level of institutionalization of the country's relationship with the 
EU. Additionally, it could be noted that the scope of MPE characteristic of interest 
contestation, which already comprises foreign interest groups, should be enlarged to 
the domestic political arena as it was observed that domestic interest groups merely 
interact in the national political arena. While, this thesis provides an interesting 
empirical study of MPE, further research is needed to solidify the afore-discussed 
findings. Indeed, this study should only be the starting point of further empirical 
testing of MPE, especially in other non-trade areas, as the empirical research potential 
remains immense and is likely to increase with the ongoing regulatory expansion the 
EU is experiencing.  
 Finally, the findings not only have theoretical implications but are also of 
relevance for the current policy debate. First, in the context of the present "Brexit" 
negotiations, the United Kingdom (UK) should consider the long-term consequences 
of leaving the EU's regulatory framework. Indeed, due to the fact that the Single 
Market acts as a magnetic force and is likely to evolve further, the costs of leaving 
this framework will become increasingly high. Especially with regards to energy 
security, maintaining close links with the European regulatory order will become vital 
for the UK. As a consequence, the UK should sustain its ties with the EU and seek to 
achieve an agreement where its own market-related policies and regulations remain 
closely linked to the EU ones. Second, the findings suggest that the EU should 
concentrate on the development of its Single Market and regulatory capacity in order 
to shape third countries' regulatory order instead of focusing solely on the diffusion of 
norms through conditionality and socialization. Yet, norm compatibility still matters 
as a factor of effective rule-transfer as observed in our case studies, notably for 
climate change mitigation policies. Second, in order to enable itself to fully deploy its 
market power, the EU should institutionalise further its sectorial and global relations 
with key partner countries and facilitate the development of market linkages. Indeed, 
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the relevance of formal EU borders is diminishing as the EU is creating larger 
functional sectorial entities. The planed reform of the Energy Community, which 
foresees the set up of a Court of Justice able to fine members for non-compliance with 
their deadlines of acquis implementation, is a encouraging example for the 
development of a structured and sectorial-tailored market power-friendly 
environment.229 Institutionalizing its relationship with third countries is especially 
important given the fact that the EU's regulatory order is continuously modified. 
Institutional frameworks ensuring dynamic acquis approximation and ongoing 
cooperation with partner countries are therefore crucially needed if the EU wants to 
enshrine further its position as a globally assertive market power. 
  
  
                                                
229 Conclusions from the High Level Reflection Group issued in June 2014. In Energy Community 
Secretariat (2014), "ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION REPORT 2013/2014", 23-24. 
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